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Abstract
Using matched employer-employee data on 10 African countries, this paper examines the rela-
tionship beween wages, worker supervision, and labor productivity in manufacturing. Wages increase
with ￿rm size for both production workers and supervisors. We develop a two-tier model of super-
vision that can account for this stylized fact and we ￿t the structural model to the data. Employee
data is used to derive a ￿rm-speci￿c wage premium that is purged of the eﬀect of worker observables.
We ￿n das t r o n ge ﬀect of both supervision and wages on eﬀort and hence on labor productivity. La-
bor management in sub-Saharan Africa appears problematic, with much higher supervisor-to-worker
ratios than in Morocco and a higher elasticity of eﬀort with respect to supervision.
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Prosperity varies dramatically across regions of the world. Many economists believe this has to do with
diﬀerences in the quality of manpower. These beliefs are typically expressed in terms of human capital,
that is, of schooling and vocational skills (e.g. Barro & i Martin 1992, Mankiw, Romer & Weil 1992).
Countries with uneducated manpower, the story goes, provide low returns on capital and fail to attract
foreign investments. As a result, they grow less fast or not at all. The solution is to increase expenditures
in education.
Not all economists share these views, however. Economists focusing on sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
for instance, have long noted the lack of relationship between school enrollment rates and economic
performance, either across countries or over time (e.g. Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps, Gauthier,
Gunning, Isaksson, Oduro, Oostendorp, Patillo, Soderbom, Teal, Zeufack & Appleton 2000a, Teal 2000,
Soderbom & Teal 2001). Africa is often characterized by unemployment among school graduates (e.g.
Eicher 1985, Serneels 1999). This situation is hard to reconcile with the idea that a shortage of educated
manpower is what sti￿es growth in the continent. If there is something wrong with African manpower
quality, it is unlikely to be schooling per se.
An alternative explanation is labor management. During the colonial era, it was customary for au-
thorities to complain about workers￿ lack of eﬀort. Such claims should be heavily discounted as in￿uenced
by the ideology of the time and may have re￿ected passive resistance to colonialism on the part of workers.
Recent evidence is more troubling. It has been claimed that managers and workers in African ￿rms often
show little loyalty to their employer (Ezeala-Harrison 1991). Absenteeism is blamed on the ￿extended
family system￿ that obliges employees to assists parents in need. Pilferage is a concern too: Fafchamps &
Minten (2001) show that 37% of agricultural traders in Madagascar refrain from hiring more employees
for fear of employee theft. Using data from manufacturing ￿rms in Cote d￿Ivoire, Azam & Lesueur (1997)
show that worker supervision is a serious concern among large ￿rms. Breach of employment contract
by employers is also mentioned as an endemic problem. Labor management problems need not be due
to opportunistic behavior but originate in internal organization diﬃculties regarding task assignment,
coordination between workers and units, and reporting and monitoring. Many African entrepreneurs
1indeed complain about the diﬃculty to manage a large labor force. Could it be that labor management,
not education, is the main determinant of labor quality in poor countries with little or no experience in
wage employment?
This is not a far-fetched notion. After all, we know that self-discipline and the capacity to obey
instructions is one of the skills imparted by education ￿ so much so that employers may pay a premium
for workers who obtain their diploma from a regular day school (e.g. Cameron & Heckman 1993, Tyler,
Murnane & Willett 2000). Corruption, which is blamed for many of the evils of underdevelopment, is
largely a worker discipline problem: if workers followed their job description, there would be much less
corruption. Lack of loyalty towards large formal organizations such as states and ￿rms has long been noted
and blamed for the prevalence of corruption (e.g. Bayart 1989, Bates 1983, Bauer 1971). As suggested by
Platteau (1996), one possible explanation for this state of aﬀairs is the existence in SSA of sharing norms
that makes shirking more morally acceptable. Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps, Gauthier, Gunning,
Isaksson, Oduro, Oostendorp, Patillo, Soderbom, Teal & Zeufack (2004) indeed document the prevalence
of rent sharing between ￿rms and their workers. Barr & Oduro (2002) ￿nd that workers who are related
to their employers earn a premium and there is statistical discrimination in favour of inexperienced co-
ethnic workers. These ￿ndings are consistent with the idea that employers trust relatives more. Taken
together, these concerns might help explain why African manufacturing ￿rms remain quite small by
international standards: 100 workers on average, excluding enterprises of less than ￿ve workers (Bigsten,
Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps, Gauthier, Gunning, Isaksson, Oduro, Oostendorp, Patillo, Soderbom, Teal
& Zeufack 2000b).
This paper revisits this issue using matched worker-enterprise data in manufacturing. We contrast
two mechanisms by which ￿rms seek to motivate their workers: supervision and wages. To capture
them, we formulate a two-tier model of supervision in which middle-level managers must be monitored
by shareholders. This structural model is then econometrically estimated using data from nine countries
in SSA and one North-African country, Morocco. We think of Morocco as a control case, representing the
situation in a middle income country with labor management problems comparable to those encountered
in other middle income countries. Descriptive analysis show that worker supervision falls with ￿rm size
2while wages rise, which is consistent with our theoretical model.
Econometric estimation yields parameter estimates of the structural two-tier supervision model. Esti-
mation is accomplished by solving the theoretical model numerically and iterating on parameter estimates.
Results suggest that, at the sample average, the elasticity of worker eﬀort with respect to wage is around
0.45 in SSA and 0.74 in Morocco. In contrast, the elasticity of worker eﬀort with respect to supervision
is around 0.27 in SSA and 0.11 in Morocco. We ￿nd a non-negligible trade-oﬀ between supervision and
wages as alternative ways of motivating workers. At the sample average, a decrease in supervision by
20% reduces worker eﬀort by 6% in SSA and 3% in Morocco, holding everything else constant. To keep
eﬀort constant, worker wages must increase by 10-12% in SSA and by 3% in Morocco.
This paper contributes to the literature in various ways. The model and analysis presented here
elaborate on a possible explanation for the often observed positive relationship between wages and ￿rm
size (Oi & Idson 1999). The fact that wages in Africa increase particularly rapidly with ￿rm size is
consistent with the view that labor management is a more acute problem there ￿ possibly because
of lower school enrollment rates in the population at large (e.g. Mazumdar & Mazaheri 2002, Strobl
& Thornton 2001). If con￿rmed by subsequent research, this ￿nding has deep implications for our
understanding of the early development process. Our contribution is also methodological as we combine
non-parametric and structural estimation methods to throw light on labor eﬃciency issues.
The paper is organized as follows. A conceptual framework is introduced in Section 2. A two-tier
eﬃciency wage model is constructed in which that middle-rank managers and administrative staﬀ must be
monitored by shareholders. The data are presented in Section 3 together with a non-parametric analysis
of labor management. Using matched worker-employer data, we ￿nd that wages increase with ￿rm size
even after we correct for observable human capital. We also ￿nd that supervision ratios fall with ￿rm
size, a ￿nding contrary to that of Ringuede (1998) for French enterprises. Section 4 estimates a structural
eﬃciency wage model that combines ￿rm level and individual level data. Conclusions appear in Section
5.
32. Conceptual framework
As a basis for our empirical analysis, we construct a two-tiered model of wages and worker supervision.
This model nests a number of simpler model as special cases. We begin by presenting the most general
model. We then discuss a number of special cases and illustrate how they diﬀer in their predictions
regarding wages and supervision. We then describe our testing strategy.
2.1. The general model
We construct a model of ￿rms￿ labor management decisions. Workers are divided into two categories:
production workers (hereafter workers), denoted L, and supervisors, denoted S.F i r m sc h o o s et h en u m b e r
of workers and supervisors they hire. They also set wages w for workers and m for supervisors. The
eﬀort provided by workers depend on their wage w and on the extent of supervision p.W e w r i t e t h e
eﬀort function as:




where x,c,d, and b are parameters, with c ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, d ≥ 0,a n dx ≥ 0.A s i m i l a r e ﬀort function is
assumed for supervisors:
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where p0 measures the extent to which supervisors are themselves supervised by ￿rm owners, and x0,c 0,d 0,
and b0 are model parameters.
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) imply that eﬀort is increasing with wage (w and m) a n dw i t hs u p e r v i s i o n
(p and p0). The choice of this functional form is dictated by several considerations. First, it is sparse
in parameters and yet able to deliver results of interest (Stiglitz 1987). Second, it nests a number of
interesting special cases. For instance, if c =0(b =0 ), eﬀort is unresponsive to wages (supervision).
Finally, the eﬀort function derived by Sparks (1986) using an explicit worker dismissal model is a special
case of equation (2.1) with c = b =0 .5, x = rV U,a n dd =1 /2r where r is the workers￿ rate of
time preference and V U is the expected life-time utility from becoming unemployed (see also Ringuede
4(1998)).1 Because in Sparks￿ framework x and x0 are interpretable as the income employees receive if
they are sacked from their current job, we sometimes refer to these parameters as measuring the ￿outside
option￿ of workers and supervisors.
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are suﬃciently general to capture a variety of eﬀects that have been discussed
in the literature (e.g. Stiglitz 1987, Oi & Idson 1999, Abowd & Kramarz 1999). The eﬀect of wages on
eﬀort may be due to the fear of losing one￿s job or to the morale-boosting of higher-than-average wages.
Supervision eﬀects may due to the probability of dismissal of workers found shirking, as in Shapiro &
Stiglitz (1984) and Sparks (1986). It may also be driven by other labor management eﬀects, such as
information processing within the ￿rm, the organization of team work, etc (e.g. Itoh 1991, Fudenberg &
Tirole 1991, Williamson 1985).
Next we assume that extent of supervision p is proportional to the supervisor per worker ratio,





This implies that the more eﬀort supervisors provide, the more closely monitored workers are, and
t h em o r ee ﬀort is supplied by workers themselves. We apply the same reasoning to the supervision of





Firms are assumed to choose employment levels L and S and remuneration levels w and m so as to
maximize pro￿ts:
max
L,S,w,m,p,p0 a(eL)β −wL −mS
subject to equations (2.1), (2.3), (2.2), and (2.4)
1Sparks uses a slightly diﬀerent formulation with (1+ 2r
p )
1
2 as second term. Given that we use a Cobb-Douglas production
function, dividing Sparks￿ second term by 2r yields an eﬀort function equivalent to ours, except for a (2r)
1
2 term in front.
The factored out term only aﬀects the constant in the production function and can be ignored in the analysis.
5where a stands for everything other than labor in the production function. After replacing throughout p
and p0 by equations (2.3) and (2.4), the ￿rst order conditions are:


















where the derivatives of the eﬀort functions are given by:


















2.2. No eﬀort function
To understand the properties of the model, it is useful to proceed step by step and to start from a
simpli￿ed version with no supervision. Formally, let c = b = c0 = b0 =0 .C o n s e q u e n t l y , e and e0 are





which immediately yields S =0and the usual ￿rst order condition:
w = aβLβ−1
2S i n c ew a g e sh a v en oe ﬀect on eﬀort, the ￿rm would naturally wish to set w =0 . This unrealistic prediction can be
eliminated either by assuming that ￿rms do not set wages, or that, by an arbitrage argument, they must set wages at least
equal to wages paid by other employers. In this case, ￿rms choose a wage exactly equal to the going market wage.
6where uw is, as before, a error term. In this simple case, we expect no relationship between w and ￿rm
size: on average, all ￿rms pay the same wage, irrespective of size. Moreover, there are no supervisors.
2.3. Eﬃciency wage model
The standard eﬃciency wage model without supervision is obtained by assuming that b = c0 = b0 =0 .
Pro￿t maximization with respect to L and w yields the usual ￿rst order conditions:
w = aeββLβ−1
L = aβeβ−1ewLβ




Since here e (and thus ew) only depends on w, the Solow condition implies that all ￿rms pay the same
wage, irrespective of size. Sparks (1986) provides behavioral underpinnings for a special case of this
model in which c =0 .5.
2.4. Supervision by owner
Let us now assume that the eﬀort of workers varies with wage and supervision matters but that all
workers are supervised by the ￿rm owner. Formally, this means assuming that c0 = d0 =0and b0 =1 ,
implying that e0 =1 /S, and thus that p =1 /L. In this case, the optimization model is:
max
L,S≥0,w,m
a(eL)β − wL− mS subject to







7As in the previous sub-sections, it is optimal to set S = m =0 . For the other choice variables, the ￿rst
order conditions are:
w = aeββLβ−1 − aβeβ−1epLβ−2
L = aβeβ−1ewLβ
Combining the two ￿rst order conditions, we obtain:
e −epp = wew (2.9)
w h i c hc a nb em a n i p u l a t e dt oy i e l da ne x p r e s s i o nf o rw as a function of p:
w =
x(1−b + dp)
1 −b − c + dp − cdp





[b +( c − 1)(1 + dp)]
2 ≤ 0
Since p =1 /L, this shows that larger ￿rms in terms of L pay higher wages: workers need to be motivated
to exercise more care or eﬀort given that they are monitored less closely. Wages are used to compensate
for lower levels of supervision.
2.5. Constant supervisor eﬀort
Next we introduce supervisors but keep e0 constant. Formally, this boils down to assuming c0 = b0 =0 ,
which implies that e0 =1 . Given this assumption, it makes sense to assume that the wage rate of
8supervisors is given exogenously.3 We have:
max
L,S,w
a(eL)β − wL− mS subject to







which can be rewritten more simply as:
max
L,p,w
a(eL)β − wL− mpL subject to




since S = pL.T h e￿rst order conditions boil down to:







In this model, the supervision ratio S/L is constant across ￿rms of diﬀerent size. Indeed the ￿rst order





which establishes a relationship between w and p that does not depend on ￿rm size L. Combining the




which sets another relationship between p and w that does not depend on L. Consequently, in this model,
p and w are constant across ￿rms. The intuition is that ￿rm can buy the supervision from the market at
a constant marginal price.
3Or that, by an arbitrage argument, ￿rms have to pay the going market wage for supervisors.
92.6. Constant supervisor wage
Next we consider what happens if supervisor eﬀort varies with the supervision of supervisors by the
owner. We continue to assume that m is exogenously given. This means that m is not regarded as a
choice variable for the ￿rm. We have:
max
L,S,w
a(eL)β − wL− mS subject to














w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dp0 =1 /S: supervisors are supervised by the owner. The ￿rst order conditions are:













In this model, the eﬀort of supervisors is not constant. Raising the eﬀort of production workers by hiring








which is diﬀerent from our earlier expression (2.10) because of the presence of S. The implication is that
the supervision ratio S/L decreases with ￿rm size while wage w increases. This is because the owner
￿nds it diﬃcult to monitor all supervisors, whose eﬀort level drops with ￿rm size. The end result is the
same as in the model where the owner monitors everyone directly: the ￿rm trades higher wages for less
eﬀective supervision p. The wage m paid to supervisors does not, however, increase with ￿rm size since,
in this special case, it is assumed constant.
102.7. The testing strategy
The general model is the same as the model discussed in the previous sub-section, except that we regard
m as a choice variable. The only diﬀerence with the earlier model is that now m also increases with
￿rm size. The rationale behind this result is that larger ￿rms need more supervisors to monitor their
growing workforce but cannot monitor the supervisors as closely. This reduces supervisors￿ incentives.
To compensate, large ￿rms pay higher supervisor wages m to induce more eﬀort. This eﬀect is similar
in spirit to the force that aﬀects workers￿ wage w. This in turn implies that supervision costs increase
with ￿rm size. To economize on supervision, large ￿rms lower the supervision ratio S/L. To minimize
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect on workers￿ motivation, they raise the wage w of production workers.
These eﬀects are illustrated on Figures 1 and 2 which show, for some reasonable choice of parameter
values, how wages and supervision ratio change with ￿rm size.4 We see that w and m are increasing in L
while S/L is decreasing in L. Larger ￿rms pay higher wages to both supervisors and production workers.
At the same time, they monitor production workers less closely. The magnitude of the eﬀect is large but
commensurate with what is observed in our data.
To summarize, we have shown that our general model nests a variety of simpler models, including the
standard producer model and the eﬃciency wage model. It can therefore be used as a way of testing the
restrictions imposed by simpler models. To this eﬀect, we estimate a ￿ve equation model composed of
the four ￿rst order conditions (2.5) to (2.8) and the production function
Q = a(eL)β exp(εq) (2.11)
where εq is an error term. Observed values of e w, e m, e L, and e s are assumed to include measurement error
4The Figures are obtained using coeﬃcient values derived from the Sparks model, namely, c = b = c0 = b0 =0 .5,
x = rV U,a n dd = d0 =1 /2r where r i st h ew o r k e r s ￿r a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dV U is the expected life-time utility from
becoming unemployed.
11so that:
ln e w =l n w + εw (2.12)
ln e m =l n m +εm (2.13)
ln e L =l n L +εl (2.14)
ln ￿ S =l n S + εs (2.15)
where w,m,L, and S are the values that solve the system of ￿rst order conditions (2.5) to (2.8). The
advantage of formulating the error structure using (2.12) to (2.15) is that, from an econometric point of
view, the system to be estimated is a reduced form system of non-linear equations, thereby eliminating
simultaneity concerns. The system formed by the ￿ve equations (2.11) to (2.15) is estimated using
non-linear generalized least squares (GLS). The details of the estimation procedure are discussed in the
econometric section.
In testing the theory we begin by examining the data for evidence of the kind of patterns predicted by
the theory. In particular, we examine whether w and m increase with ￿rm size and whether S/L decreases
with ￿rm size. This test is conducted in a non-parametric manner without imposing any restriction on
the shape of the relationship. This test serves to pre-validate the model, to avoid ￿forcing￿ on the data a
relationship that is not there. We then proceed by estimating the complete model and test the coeﬃcients
of the eﬀort functions individually ￿ in particular, we test whether c =0 , b =0 , c0 =0 ,a n db0 =0 .
Indeed we have seen that, when these coeﬃcients are 0, the general model simpli￿es to one of the special
models discussed earlier.
There are other possible reasons why large ￿rms pay high wages (e.g. Troske 1999, Bayard & Troske
1999). One reason that has received some attention in the literature is the possibility that large ￿rms
employ better workers. Stiglitz (1987), for instance, argues that worker productivity ￿ observed and
unobserved ￿ will be correlated with ￿rm size if the returns to better workers are larger in large ￿rms.
This is because large ￿rms would either screen workers more eﬀectively at hiring, or dismiss those who
prove less productive. As a result of this self-selection process, their workforce may be statistically
12diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a to fs m a l l e r￿rms where worker quality has less impact on ￿rm productivity. The self-
selection explanation of the relationship between ￿rm size and wages does not predict any systematic
relationship between ￿rm size and supervision ratio. If we ￿nd such relationship, it would suggest that
other factors are at work, such as the ones discussed here.
There are several reasons why large ￿rms may require better workers. One possibility is that they have
complicated equipment that is hard to operate and vulnerable to mishandling. This idea is empirically
testable by examining whether ￿rms with a larger capital-labor ratio pay higher wages. In our analysis,
we partially control for this possibility by focusing on a subset of industries that share similar capital
intensity. Another possibility is that, in large ￿rms, the organization of work is complex and worker
discipline is important to achieve coordination. This latter idea is close to our focus, except that we
regard worker eﬀectiveness as an action subject to moral hazard instead of as an immutable individual
trait.
Given that we do not have panel data on individual workers, we cannot control for unobserved
heterogeneity in workers across ￿rms. But we can control for observed heterogeneity. To purge wages
from observed diﬀerences between workers, we proceed as follows. Let wij be the wage of worker j in ￿rm
i. Observed human capital for this observation is written hij. We then regress (the log of) wij on hij
and a ￿rm-level ￿xed eﬀect ωi. This is done separately for supervisors and production workers, yielding
diﬀerent c ωw and c ωm estimates for each ￿rm. When estimating (2.11) to (2.15), we replace throughout
w and m by c ωw and c ωm. This ensures that our ￿rm-speci￿cw a g em e a s u r ei sp u r g e do fd i ﬀerences in
worker productivity due to observable traits (and unobservable traits correlated with them). The average
human capital of the workforce is also included in a to control for its eﬀect on ￿rm productivity.5
3. The data
The ideas presented in the previous section are applicable anywhere. But they are particularly relevant
for SSA because of the rampant belief that African workers are less disciplined and harder to manage
5Underlying this approach is an implicit arbitrage argument by which the individual return to human capital is equal
to the associated productivity gain. Put diﬀerently, ￿rms are at the margin indiﬀerent between hiring workers with diﬀer-
ent human capital endowment because the premium paid for additional human capital is equal to the additional output
generated. If this arbitrage argument is combined with the assumption that returns to human capital are linear, then the
eﬀect of human capital on output can be captured by including in a the average human capital of the workforce.
13than, say, East-Asian or Chinese workers. This belief might help explain why international corporations
refrain from investing in Africa.
To investigate these labor management issues, we test the model presented in section 2 on matched
employer-employee data collected on the manufacturing sector of nine SSA countries and one North-
African country, Morocco. We think of Morocco as a control case, representing the situation in a middle
income country with labor management problems comparable to those encountered elsewhere in the
world.
The data used here have been collected by various teams of researchers. The bulk of the data from
SSA was collected as part of the Regional Program for Enterprise Development (RPED), organized by
the World Bank, in which samples of approximately 200 randomly selected ￿rms were interviewed in
eight countries (Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d￿Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).
The surveys started with Ghana in 1992, and most other country surveys were initiated in 1993. Firms
were re-interviewed three years in a row in most countries; as some ￿rms dropped out of the sample,
they were replaced with other ￿rms with similar characteristics.6 Four sectors of activity were covered:
textile and garments; wood products; metal products; and food processing. Large as well as small ￿rms,
including informal ones, were included. Information is available on a wide range of variables, including
sales and output, capital stock, entrepreneur characteristics, employment by occupational category, la-
bor turnover, wages, and con￿icts with workers. The RPED data have been extensively analyzed and
have greatly improved our understanding of manufacturing in the continent (e.g. Bigsten, Collier, Der-
con, Fafchamps, Gauthier, Gunning, Isaksson, Oduro, Oostendorp, Patillo, Soderbom, Teal, Zeufack &
Appleton 2000a, Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps, Gauthier, Gunning, Isaksson, Oduro, Oostendorp,
P a t i l l o ,S o d e r b o m ,T e a l&Z e u f a c k2 0 0 0 b).
In order to form as large a sample as possible on SSA ￿rms, we augment the RPED sample with
data from two other sources. First, we add data on Ethiopian manufacturing ￿rms that were collected
independently of RPED but using the same questionnaire.7 Ethiopia was surveyed three times but we
6Burundi was surveyed only once due to the rapid deterioration of the political situation following the Rwandan genocide.
Cote d￿Ivoire was surveyed only twice due to insuﬃcient funding.
7The Ethiopian survey was coordinated by Taye Mengistae.
14only have data for the ￿rst year, 1993. Second, we use data from the Kenyan Manufacturing Enterprise
Survey (KMES), ￿e l d e di n2 0 0 0a n dd e s i g n e da saf o l l o w - u pt ot h el a s tK e n y a nR P E Ds u r v e y . 8 This
survey generates data for 1998 and 1999.
In addition to our sample from SSA, we have data on one North-African country, namely Morocco.
The Moroccan data were collected as part of the Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Surveys (FACS),
carried out jointly by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the World Bank in 2000. A random
sample 860 ￿rms were interviewed in six towns and seven sectors. Here we only use the 680 sample ￿rms
in food processing, textile, and garment to ensure comparability. The Moroccan survey generates data
for 1998 and 1999.
One unusual feature of the data sets is that they all contain matched employer-employee information.
A tt h es a m et i m ea st h e￿rms were surveyed, a sample of workers was chosen from each ￿rm designed to
cover the full range of ￿rm employees. The objective was to have up to 10 workers from each ￿rm where
￿rm size allowed. To increase the informational content of the data, the worker sample was strati￿ed
according to occupational status. Where there is panel data, samples of workers have been interviewed
again in subsequent years, but the identity of the workers diﬀers across survey rounds.9
For the purpose of our analysis, workers are divided into three categories: production workers, su-
pervisors, and other staﬀ. Production workers are skilled and unskilled workers on the shop ￿oor, plus
technicians and maintenance personnel. These are the workers most directly involved in the production
process itself. Supervisors include managers, foremen, and administrative staﬀ.I ns m a l la n dm e d i u m - s i z e
￿rms such as the ones in our sample, foremen represent middle-rank management and can thus be counted
as part of the management/supervision process. Among our sample ￿rms, the main role of administrative
staﬀ is to assist management in gathering and processing information essential to the monitoring of the
production process, such as reports, accounts, inventories, time sheets, and the like. For this reason, we
count them as part of the supervision personnel of the ￿rm: if the small manufacturers in our sample had
fewer employees, they essentially would keep accountants and oﬃce staﬀ to the strict minimum ￿ which,
8The KMES was organized by the Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. See Soderbom
(2001) for a report based on these data.
9In all surveys, information on worker identi￿ers was not collected to protect the con￿dentiality of workers￿ responses.
15in our case, is 0. The ￿other staﬀ￿ category is a residual category that includes commercial staﬀ,t r a i n e e s ,
craftsmen, and other support staﬀ. These workers are excluded from either L of S but are included in
the production function as part of a (see below).
The characteristics of the ￿rms in our pooled sample are summarized in Table 1. Manufacturing ￿rms
in SSA are small by international standards. The average level of employment is 106 and the median
is 45, a discrepancy consistent with the usual skewed distribution of ￿rm size. Firm size is somewhat
larger in our Moroccan sample, with average employment of 169 (median=100). The average of the log
value-added per employee corresponds to about USD 3,000 in levels.
The average supervision ratio, de￿ned as the number of supervisors to the number of production
workers, is 0.17 in Morocco and 0.41 in SSA. Medians are 0.07 and 0.23, respectively. The t-test statistic
between the two samples is 8.82, which is highly signi￿cant. We also note that the supervision ratio
￿gures for SSA are higher than for OECD data (Acemoglu & Newman 2000). This is partly because our
broad de￿nition of supervision workers includes clerical staﬀ,ad i ﬀerence that is justi￿ed by the nature
of the ￿rms we investigate. But the diﬀerence between SSA and Morocco is striking.
About 17-20 percent of the ￿rms have some foreign ownership, and slightly more than half of the
￿rms are located in the main industrial city (Casablanca for Morocco). Around 10 percent of surveyed
managers have only primary education, 43 percent have secondary or professional education, and 44
percent have a university degree. Moroccan managers are, on average, more educated. About a third
of the ￿rms employ unionized workers. The distribution across countries is highly non-uniform. The
largest sub-Saharan sample is Kenya, followed by Zambia. We lose many observations in Cameroon,
Cote d￿Ivoire and Ethiopia due to missing data.
I nT a b l e2w es h o ws u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c sb a s e do nt h es a m p l eo fw o r k e r s .W eh a v ec o m p l e t ed a t ao na
total of 19,924 production workers and 7,022 supervisors. The average monthly earnings for production
workers is USD 93 in SSA vs. USD 259 in Morocco. For supervisors earnings are much larger, on average
USD 172 in SSA and 853 in Morocco. A breakdown by country (not shown to save space) reveals that
there are substantial diﬀerences across countries. For both production workers and supervisors, Tanzania
has the lowest median of earnings (USD 32 and USD 49, respectively). Incidentally, diﬀerentials between
16countries are often close to diﬀerentials in per capita income as reported in the World Development
Indicators database.10
Production workers have on average eight years of education and seven years of tenure with the
present ￿rm. Interestingly, the level of education does not vary much across countries. Morocco, the
country in our sample with by far the highest per capita income, ranks second from the bottom in terms
of the average level of education of production workers; only Ivory Coast records a lower sample average.
Supervisors have on average 12 years of education, and eight years of tenure. While Moroccan production
workers are on average less educated than their counterparts in SSA, Moroccan supervisors are better
educated. The average age for both categories of workers is close to 35 years. About a ￿fth of the sample
of production workers, and approximately a third of the sample of supervisors, are women.
4. Econometric estimation
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating earnings regressions using the worker data. As explained
in Section 2, the purpose of these regressions is to obtain a measure of ￿rm-speci￿c wage premium that
is net of observable diﬀerences in workforce quality. These ￿rm-speci￿cw a g ep r e m i aa r et h e nu s e da s
estimates of wi and mi. Next, we take a fairly agnostic view at the data, trying to assess whether they
exhibit the kind of patterns predicted by the model. This step is done without imposing much structure
on the data. Having validated the model, the third step estimates the model directly by applying GLS
to the non-linear system (2.11) to (2.15).
4.1. Earnings regressions
The estimated earnings equation takes the form:
logwijt = ωit +θhijt +υijt (4.1)
10Measured in constant 1995 USD, the per capita GNP in Morocco is about 1350 and in Tanzania about 180, hence
yielding a diﬀerence of factor 7.4.
17where wijt is the wage of worker j in ￿rm i at time t, hijt is a vector of human capital characteristics
of worker j, ωit is a ￿rm ￿xed eﬀect allowed to vary over time, and υijt is an error term (Abowd &
Kramarz 1999). The regression is estimated separately for production workers and supervisors.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for production workers and supervisors, respectively, both pooled
and by sub-sample.11 Education has a non-linear, convex, eﬀect on earnings, manifesting itself here
through the signi￿cance of the squared term on education. Since marginal returns of education vary
with the level of education, for ease of interpretation we show the marginal returns computed at six and
twelve years of education. For production workers, the returns are very low at low levels of education;
they are equal to 1.4 per cent at six years of education. At twelve years, the marginal return reverts
around 5.5 percent in SSA and 3 percent in Morocco. Marginal returns to education are much higher
for supervisors, especially at higher levels of schooling in SSA. This suggests a high demand to highly
educated supervisors South of the Sahara.
The age-earnings pro￿le has an inverse U-shape in all cases. The tenure coeﬃcient is positive and
signi￿cant, indicating that new workers earn less. This feature is consistent with the idea that ￿rms
adjust wages to productivity after hiring ￿ either because workers learn on the job and become better,
or because ￿rms learn more about their intrinsic ability. It is noted, however, that the reward to tenure
is small ￿ typically about one per cent per year for production workers, less for supervisors. The gender
dummy is negative in both sub-samples, indicating that women have signi￿cantly lower earnings than
men with the same observable characteristics.
The ￿rm ￿xed eﬀects explain much of the wage diﬀerences between workers. For the pooled production
workers model, for instance, the ￿rm eﬀects alone account for 82 per cent of the explained variation in
wages.12 Some 89 per cent of total wage variation can be explained either by ￿xed-eﬀects or human
capital diﬀerences. The importance of ￿rm-level characteristics is at prima facie consistent with our
theory, where ￿rms adjust their wages in order to motivate workers to exert a certain level of eﬀort.
11In the estimation of the structural model, coeﬃcient estimates by sub-sample are used.
12R - s q u a r e dr e p o r t e di nT a b l e s3a n d4r e f e rt ow i t h i nv a r i a t i o n ,n o tb e t w e e no ro v e r a l l .
184.2. Validating the model
Next, we investigate how predicted ￿rm ￿xed eﬀects b ωit correlate with ￿rm size. The general model
presented in Section 2 predicts that large ￿rms pay more to production workers and supervisors and that
the wage diﬀerential between the two categories also increases with size. We investigate whether these
predictions are consistent with our data. To control for worker productivity eﬀects, we do not use actual
wages but use b ωit instead.
To check for robustness, we experiment with three diﬀerent ways of measuring b ωit. First we compute
￿rm ￿xed eﬀects both from pooled and country regressions (Tables 3 and 4). We also estimate earnings
regressions without ￿rm-level controls or ￿xed-eﬀects and take the ￿rm-speci￿c averages of the residuals
as an alternative measure of b ωit . The reason for doing so is that ￿going within￿ may exacerbate the eﬀects
of measurement errors and bias the associated coeﬃcients towards zero (Griliches & Hausman 1986). If
this is the case, ￿xed eﬀects estimates would do a poor job in purging the data from heterogeneity in
observable human capital. We then regress the alternative measures of b ωit on various measures of ￿rm
size (in logarithms) and a set of country and sector dummies.
Table 5 reports the estimated size coeﬃcients, interpretable as elasticities, and the associated t-values
for various permutations. In the top panel of the table, size is measured as the number of production or
supervision workers, depending on the earnings function estimated. The size coeﬃcients are about 0.09
for production workers when using the ￿xed eﬀects estimates and about 0.07 when using ￿rm averages
of OLS residuals. For supervisors they are somewhat larger: 0.13 when using ￿xed eﬀects and 0.12 when
based on the OLS residuals. All coeﬃcients are highly signi￿cant. The middle panel shows that these
results are aﬀected little when we use total employment as size measure instead. In the bottom panel we
use the capital stock as ￿nal size measure. Coeﬃcients are uniformly smaller, but the size-eﬀect is still
highly signi￿cant and larger for supervisors than for production workers. The results demonstrate that
earnings (purged from observed human capital heterogeneity) increase with ￿rm size. The increase is
faster for supervisors than for production workers. Both ￿ndings are consistent with the model presented
in Section 2. In the rest of the analysis, we use b ωit computed on the basis of Tables 3 and 4.
19Figures 3 to 6 show results from a non-parametric analysis of wages and supervision ratio.13 Figure
3 shows how the (log of the) supervisor-to-worker ratio S/L varies with ￿rm size in the two sub-samples.
We observe a strong signi￿cant decline between S/L and L in both cases, but S/L in SSA is systematically
above that in Morocco. This suggests that the higher supervision ratio observed in Africa is not due to
ad i ﬀerence in ￿rm size: SSA has more supervisor per worker at all ￿rm sizes.
Figure 4 depicts the relation between ￿rm size and the ￿rm-speci￿cw a g ee ﬀect b ωit for production
workers. Figure 5 shows the corresponding relation for supervisors. In both Figures, regression lines
indicate a positive relationship between wages and ￿rm size in both sub-samples, except at either ends of
the spectrum where the relationship becomes less precise. All these results are in line with the predictions
made by the more general model presented in Section 2. They constitute prima facie evidence that the
model is compatible with the data.
In Figure 6 we show how the earnings diﬀerential between supervisors and production workers varies
with size. When Sparks coeﬃcients of 0.5 are used for c,c0,b,and b0,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h ee a r n i n g s
diﬀerential between workers and supervisors increases rapidly with size. This need not be the case with
other parameter values. Figure 5 shows that in our sample the earnings diﬀerential increases slightly with
￿rm size, but the eﬀect is not signi￿cant. This constitutes prima facie evidence against Sparks coeﬃcients
for the eﬀort functions.
The next step in our analysis is to examine how supervision and wages impact on productivity. Before
estimating the structural model directly, we begin with a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
to which we add variables that aﬀect workers￿ eﬀort, namely the supervision ratio and predicted wages.
Value-added is the dependent variable. To minimize omitted variable bias, additional controls are included
as well, such as ￿rm age and foreign ownership. The regression takes the form:





+ β4b ωw +β5b ωm +εq (4.2)
13Results were obtained using locally weighted regressions based on an Epanechnikov kernel. A 95% asymptotic con￿dence
interval is displayed. It is computed on the basis of the standard error of the constant in locally weighted regressions. The
bandwidth is 0.4. We have applied a 5% trimming to eliminate observations that are too unrepresentative. All regressions
control for country and sector through ￿rst diﬀerence.
20OLS estimates of equation 4.2 are shown in Table 6. Predicted wages are shown to have the anticipated
positive eﬀect on productivity in some of the regressions. In the sub-Saharan regression, the estimated
coeﬃcient on workers￿ wage is 0.58 and signi￿cant at the 1 per cent level. In Morocco, supervisor wage
is also signi￿cant at the 1 per cent level. In Table 7 we report two-stage least squares results, treating
production workers as an endogenous variable. Instruments include lagged total employment (in log), the
manager￿s education, a dummy for whether or not the ￿r mi sl o c a t e di nt h ec a p i t a lc i t y ,a n dt h eo t h e r
exogenous variables in the structural estimation (see below). Most of the coeﬃcients of interest are quite
similar between the instrumented and uninstrumented regressions.
4.3. Structural Estimation
We have seen that many of the qualitative features of the data are consistent with the supervision model
presented in section 2. We are now ready to impose more structure on the data by estimating the
model directly. Our aim is to estimate the production function and the ￿rst order conditions described
in equations (2.11) to (2.15). Our task is to estimate the parameters of the production function plus
c,b,x,d,c0,x 0,d 0, and b0.14 For estimation purposes, parameter a is expanded into:







where α0 is a constant, K is capital stock, O is staﬀ other than production workers and supervisors, Fi is
as e r i e so f￿rm characteristics including the average education level and length of tenure of the workforce,
the age of the ￿rm, the percentage of foreign ownership, and the location in the capital city. The Dj￿s
are sectoral and country dummies. All these variables are regarded as exogenous in the estimation that
follows. All Greek letters are parameters to be estimated.
From an econometric point of view, the system formed by equations (2.11) to (2.15) is a non-linear
system of reduced form equations. Given the non-linear nature of the model it is not possible to solve
for w,m,L,S analytically, and so we nest the solution of the system of ￿rst order conditions within the
14In the estimation, the values of c,c0,b,d,d 0, and b0 are constrained to be positive. None of the estimated coeﬃcients is
at the boundary.
21search for parameter estimates. That is, we start from a ￿guess￿ of the parameter vector, and, conditional
on these values, solve the ￿rst order conditions (2.5) to (2.8) for each observation. We then calculate
the residuals by subtracting predicted from actual values, and compute the relevant criterion value. We
then update the parameter vector and start the process all over again, provided there is scope for further
improvements in the criterion value. If there is not, the search stops.15
With this methodology, the endogeneity of the choice variables does not result in bias of the parameter
estimates.16 The system of equations can therefore be estimated in the usual manner, i.e. through
generalized least squares (GLS). This is accomplished in two steps: the ￿rst step estimates the system
assuming a diagonal covariance matrix for the errors. An estimate of the cross-equation covariance matrix
of the errors is then obtained from the ￿rst step and the system is reestimated with the error covariance
matrix. This is equivalent to one-step non-linear seemingly unrelated regressions. Standard errors for
parameters are obtained using the outer product of the gradient.
4.4. Results
Estimation results are summarized in Table 8 for Morocco and SSA. Parameter a is time and country





it for reasons discussed above.
We ￿rst discuss the parameters of the production function. There are important similarities and
diﬀerences between SSA and Morocco. The estimated share of capital is small in both samples: 0.127
in Morocco, 0.284 in SSA. The share of labor is high in Morocco ￿ 0.738 ￿ but low in SSA ￿ 0.328. In
both samples, we see that support staﬀ makes an important and signi￿cant contribution to output.17
Coeﬃcients on productivity shifters are broadly consistent with other work using these data. Firm age
is signi￿cant in SSA but not in Morocco. Firms with some foreign ownership are more productive in
both samples, but the eﬀect is only mildly signi￿cant in Morocco. Of the two human capital variables,
15The search for the parameters is accomplished using a combination of a simulated annealing algorithm (to identify a
suitable search region) and quasi-Newton algorithm (around the point of convergence). Estimation is carried out using the
Gauss package. The computational cost of the exercise is high.
16In contrast, if we were to estimate equations (2.5) to (2.8) directly we would have to deal with the fact that there are
endogenous variables on the right-hand side of these equations. In a previous version of this paper we attempted to do so
by using a non-linear instrumental variable GMM estimator, however we found this approach quite unsatisfactory as the
results tended to be sensitive to the instrument set and the normalisations.
17Parameter δ is the coeﬃcient of log(support staﬀ+1).
22education has a strong signi￿cant eﬀect in both regressions, while job experience ￿ proxied by length of
tenure ￿ has the expected sign but is only signi￿cant in SSA. Returns to schooling appear to be higher
in SSA than in Morocco: one additional year of education for the entire labor force raises output by 8%
in SSA vs. 0.9% in Morocco.
Parameters x and x0 measure the level of wage above which eﬀort increases. In Sparks (1986), x
and x0 take a more speci￿c meaning as the measure of workers￿ income if they are sacked. To facilitate
comparison, all estimates are expressed in US$ per year. We ￿nd that both x and x0 are larger in
Morocco than in SSA. This re￿ects our earlier observation that workers are better paid in Morocco
(Figures 4 and 5). We also ￿nd large diﬀerences across SSA countries, with outside options being much
larger in Cameroon and Ivory Coast ￿ possibly re￿ecting the overvaluation of the CFA Franc over the
survey period. As anticipated, we ￿nd x0 >xin all cases: this is consistent with the idea that the outside
option of supervisor is larger than that of production workers. The diﬀerence between the two is much
larger in SSA, however, where x0 is roughly ten times x. In contrast, in Morocco x0 is only twice x.T h e
theory implies that as the diﬀerence between x0 and x shrinks, the ratio of supervisors to workers will
rise, everything else constant. This is because as x0 falls relative to x, it becomes cheaper to motivate
production workers via better supervision. Of course, in the data the supervisor-worker ratio is lower in
Morocco than in SSA. This pattern must therefore be explained by diﬀerences in other parameters in the
model. Had the relative diﬀerence between x0 and x been constant across the two samples, there would
have been even greater diﬀerences in the implied supervisor-worker ratio.
T u r n i n gt oo u rm a i nc o e ﬃcients of interest, we ￿nd that, with the exception of d in Morocco, our
coeﬃcients c,b,d,c0,b 0 and d0 are signi￿cantly diﬀerent from 0. This tends to reject all the simpler models
discussed in Section 2 in favor of our more general two-tier supervision model.18 The estimates reported
in Table 8 indicate that c,b,c0,b 0 are lower in SSA than in Morocco. This implies that eﬀort, both for
supervisors and workers, is less responsive to changes in wages and supervision in SSA than in Morocco.
How eﬀort responds to changes in total factor productivity a is central to our understanding of how
18The very low standard errors on these parameters are result in part from the non-linear nature of the model and should
not be taken too literally. It is indeed likely that similar ￿ though not identical ￿ predicted behavior would obtain from
slightly diﬀerent combination of values for c,b,c0, and b0. But changing only one of these parameters independently from
the others dramatically decrease the quality of the ￿t. This explains the high gradient and hence low standard error.
23the incentive structure faced by supervisors and workers in the ￿rms impacts on various aspects of ￿rm
behavior. In the special case of c = b = c0 = b0 =0 .5, our model boils down to a generalized (two-
tier) version of the Sparks (1986) model. A special feature of that model is that, in equilibrium, worker
and supervisor eﬀort does not vary with underlying productivity a. In the more general case where
c,b,c0,b 0 are not restricted to be equal to 0.5,e ﬀort varies with a.C o e ﬃcient estimates of c,b,c0,b 0 are
all diﬀerent from 0.5, hence rejecting the generalized Sparks model. We therefore expect eﬀort to vary
with productivity, although it is unclear how.
To investigate how diﬀerences in ￿rm productivity aﬀect eﬀort, we show in Figure 7 how (the logarithm
of) worker eﬀort responds to a change in productivity a.19 There is a striking diﬀerence between the two
samples: an increase in productivity has a positive eﬀect on worker eﬀort in Morocco, but a negative eﬀect
in SSA. In other words, while the incentive structure in Morocco is such that an increase in productivity
leads to more worker eﬀort, the converse is the case in SSA. An immediate implication is that high
productivity ￿rms in SSA hire fewer workers and supervisors (and produce less output) relative to what
they would have done if the incentive structure had been similar to that in Morocco. Quantitatively, this
eﬀect on output is large: an increase in a by 1% increases output by 2.9% in Morocco but only by 1.3% in
SSA. This is because a high productivity ￿rm in SSA ￿nds it more diﬃcult than in Morocco to manage
and supervise its labor force so as to increase or maintain eﬀort.
To illustrate the eﬀect of supervision and worker incentives on ￿rm behavior, we calculate the rela-
tionship between ￿rm size, wages, and supervision implied by estimated parameter values. Results are
presented in Figures 8-13. Figure 8 shows the association between wages and employment, as predicted
by the model on the basis of estimated parameters. The model manages to mimic the positive associa-
tion between these two variables that is present in the data (Figure 4). To facilitate interpretation we
express this relation in relative terms in Figure 9, for Morocco and three SSA countries (the curves of the
remaining SSA countries are positioned between those of Zimbabwe and Cameroon). This graph shows
that an increase in employment by 247% is associated with an increase in worker wages by between 12
and 17%, thus implying an average slope between 0.05 and 0.07.
19The Figure is constructing by taking values of ln a from the country average minus 0.5 to the country average plus 0.5,
normalizing initial log eﬀort to zero.
24Figure 10 shows that the there is a positive association between predicted supervision wages and
employment (as in Figure 5), and Figure 11 shows that supervision wages increase more rapidly with
￿rm size in Morocco than in SSA. Figure 12 shows the predicted ratio of supervisors to production
workers, and clearly the model replicates the pattern observed in the data that the supervision intensity
is much lower, on average, in Morocco than in SSA (see Figure 3). Figure 13 shows that the supervision
intensity falls more rapidly in Morocco than in SSA: an increase in ￿rm size by 247% is associated with
a fall in the supervision ratio by 19%.
It should be clear from the above that, in order to grow, ￿rms must address serious incentive problems
among production workers and supervisors. Our parameter estimates imply that doubling the number
of production workers is associated with an increase in total labor cost per unit of eﬀort (including
supervisors￿ wages) by 9% for Morocco and between 11 and 14% for SSA, depending on the country.
This is the penalty large ￿rms have to incur in order to motivate workers and manage a large workforce.
Our results hence show that there are signi￿cant diﬀerences in the incentive structures across Morocco
and SSA, and that these diﬀerences are economically important. Taken together, our ￿ndings are consis-
tent with the kind of claims and stories discussed in the introduction: managing and monitoring workers
in SSA is more costly and more problematic than in Morocco and, possibly, in other parts of the world.
Findings are also consistent with the higher absolute levels of S/L in SSA. This is because supervisors,
in spite of costing relatively more to the ￿rm, have a relatively stronger eﬀect on worker eﬀort.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined whether data on manufacturing ￿rms are consistent with a two-tier
supervision model of worker eﬀort. We began by constructing a eﬃciency labor model whereby ￿rms
optimally choose their level of supervision and the wage premium they pay their workers and supervisors
relative to other ￿rms. This model predicts an increase in wages and a decrease in supervisor-to-worker
ratio with ￿rm size. The reason is that supervisors have to be motivated to manage the workforce well.
We then take the model to a data set covering 10 African countries. The main diﬃculty about
testing supervision models is that any observed relationship between wages and ￿rm size can potentially
25be attributed to systematic diﬀerences in workers￿ traits across ￿rms. To minimize this bias, we take
advantage of matched worker-employer data to construct a ￿rm-speci￿cw a g em e a s u r et h a ti sp u r g e do fa l l
observable diﬀerences across workers. Although this approach does not entirely eliminate the possibility
of a selection bias ￿ there might remain systematic diﬀerences in unobservable worker traits across ￿rms
￿ the approach singularly reduces the likely magnitude of the bias. This is particularly true given that
the studied sectors belong to light manufacturing such as garment and textile or food processing. Most
surveyed ￿rms use dated equipment for which production work is relatively straightforward. In such an
environment, it is unclear why unobservable worker traits would account for much of the productivity
diﬀerences across ￿rms.
We begin by testing whether the data is broadly consistent with model predictions. We ￿nd that wages
increase with ￿rm size for both production workers and supervisors. We also ￿nd that the supervision
ratio drops dramatically with ￿rm size. When we regress value added on capital and labor plus wages
and the supervisor-to-worker ratio, both are shown to be strongly correlated with productivity.
Given these encouraging preliminary results, we venture to estimate the structural model itself. To
do so, we estimate a system of ￿ve non-linear equations by generalized least squares. Results show that
workers in SSA are less responsive to monitoring by supervisors than workers in Morocco. This provides
some support to the idea that labor management is more diﬃcult in Africa than elsewhere. Why this is
t h ec a s ei su n c l e a ra n dd e s e r v e sm o r er e s e a r c h .
According to our estimates, a doubling in the number of production workers is associated with an
equilibrium increase in wages of 7% in Morocco and between 7 and 9% in SSA, depending on the country.
At the same time, supervisors￿ wages increase by 22% in Morocco and between 11 and 13% in SSA. A
doubling of the number of production workers is also associated with an equilibrium fall in supervision
ratio of 12% in Morocco and between 8 and 11% in SSA. As a result of these combined eﬀects, total labor
cost per unit of eﬀort (including supervisors￿ wages) increases by 9% for Morocco and between 11 and
14% for SSA. This is the penalty large ￿rms have to incur in order to motivate workers.
The analysis presented here suggest that labor management is a seriously underestimated problem.
This might be especially true in Sub-Saharan Africa where manpower has generally spent little time in
26school and has not been brought up within the routine of daily school attendance throughout adolescence.
What is important to recognize, however, is that the analysis presented here cannot ascertain whether
labor management problems come from poor enforcement of labor contracts (shirking, absenteeism, pil-
ferage) or from diﬃculties in organizing the labor force within the ￿rm (task assignment, coordination
between workers and production units, information transfer within the ￿rm).
Given that the workforce in SSA is often illiterate and unfamiliar with the technical intricacies of
manufacturing, it seems reasonable to suspect internal organization to be the root of labor management
diﬃculties. Several observations militate against this interpretation. First, production workers in SSA
manufacturing have a fairly high average level of education. Second, the manufacturing labor force in
our Moroccan sample is less well educated than that of our SSA sample, and yet labor management
problems appear less acute in Morocco. To the extent that internal organization diﬃculties originate
in poor education, this does not appear as a complete explanation for the diﬀerence between SSA and
Morocco. The enforcement of labor contracts seems, a prima facie, a more promising avenue of enquiry.
It is also conceivable that the internal organization of labor is more diﬃcult in SSA than elsewhere for
reasons other than insuﬃcient education, for instance because of frequent machine breakdown, power
cut, and input shortages. These issues deserve more investigation.
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30TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS, FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES
[1] Pooled [2] Sub-Saharan Africa [3] Morocco
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Employment 136.93 61.00 214.65 106.16 45.00 213.55 169.06 100.00 211.20
log Value-Added / Employee 8.02 8.10 1.11 7.69 7.76 1.23 8.36 8.31 0.85
log Capital / Employee 8.55 8.56 1.42 8.59 8.74 1.53 8.50 8.32 1.29
log Supervision Ratio -2.04 -2.03 1.18 -1.42 -1.47 0.95 -2.69 -2.71 1.04
Firm Age / 100 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.13
Any Foreign Ownership 0.19 0.17 0.20
Location in Capital City 0.55 0.52 0.58
MANED, Primary 0.11 0.11 0.10
MANED, Secondary / Prof. 0.43 0.60 0.25
MANED, University 0.44 0.28 0.61
Kenya 0.20 0.39








Food Processing 0.20 0.26 0.14
Wood & Furniture 0.13 0.25 0.00
Textile & Garments 0.56 0.28 0.86
Metal & Machinery 0.11 0.22 0.00
Observations 1390 710 680TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS, PRODUCTION WORKER AND SUPERVISOR CHARACTERISTICS
[1] Pooled [2] Sub-Saharan Africa [3] Morocco
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
A. Production Workers
Monthly earnings (USD) 177.9 172.6 147.1 93.1 67.8 88.4 259.2 215.3 146.3
Education (years) 8.4 9.0 4.4 9.5 11.0 3.4 7.3 8.0 5.0
Age  33.5 32.0 9.1 33.4 32.0 9.6 33.7 32.0 8.6
Tenure 7.3 5.0 6.6 7.4 5.0 6.9 7.2 5.0 6.4
Female 0.27 0.12 0.41
Observations 19924 9755 10169
B. Supervisors
Monthly earnings (USD) 375.7 198.6 538.7 171.8 123.8 148.5 852.8 620.5 770.2
Education (years) 12.5 12.0 3.0 11.8 12.0 2.5 14.1 14.0 3.3
Age  36.6 35.0 9.1 36.3 35.0 9.3 37.4 36.0 8.5
Tenure 8.2 6.0 7.2 8.5 6.0 7.6 7.5 6.0 6.2
Female 0.25 0.25 0.25
Observations 7022 4920 2102TABLE 3 
EARNINGS REGRESSIONS FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS, WITH FIXED EFFECTS
[1] Pooled [2] Sub-Saharan Africa [3] Morocco
Coef. Std. Err t-value Coef. Std. Err t-value Coef. Std. Err t-value
Education (years) -0.012 0.002 -5.440 -0.027 0.004 -6.390 -0.002 0.002 -0.720
Education
2 / 100 0.214 0.015 13.900 0.340 0.028 12.070 0.130 0.017 7.540
Age  0.029 0.002 15.440 0.037 0.003 12.550 0.022 0.002 9.270
Age
2 / 100 -0.026 0.002 -10.720 -0.036 0.004 -9.320 -0.018 0.003 -5.770
Tenure (years) 0.009 0.001 14.350 0.007 0.001 7.100 0.010 0.001 13.980
Female -0.133 0.007 -18.590 -0.161 0.016 -10.020 -0.124 0.007 -17.260
Marginal return at 0.014 0.014 0.014
education = 6
Marginal return at 0.040 0.055 0.030
education = 12
R-squared (within) 0.14 0.13 0.1738
Observations 19924 9755 10169
The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly earnings, expressed in USD.TABLE 4 
EARNINGS REGRESSIONS FOR SUPERVISORS, WITH FIXED EFFECTS
[1] Pooled [2] Sub-Saharan Africa [3] Morocco
Coef. Std. Err t-value Coef. Std. Err t-value Coef. Std. Err t-value
Education (years) -0.010 0.011 -0.930 -0.058 0.015 -3.980 0.014 0.018 0.790
Education
2 / 100 0.392 0.052 7.480 0.736 0.069 10.660 0.080 0.080 1.010
Age  0.060 0.006 9.550 0.066 0.007 9.950 0.040 0.015 2.700
Age
2 / 100 -0.051 0.008 -6.590 -0.062 0.008 -7.490 -0.020 0.018 -1.090
Tenure (years) 0.003 0.002 1.930 0.004 0.002 2.600 0.010 0.004 2.660
Female -0.117 0.019 -6.240 -0.090 0.021 -4.250 -0.226 0.037 -6.100
Marginal return at 0.037 0.030 0.024
education = 6
Marginal return at 0.084 0.119 0.030
education = 12
R-squared (within) 0.21 0.27 0.20
Observations 7022 4920 2102
The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly earnings, expressed in USD.TABLE 5 
THE FIRM-SIZE EARNINGS RELATION: RESULTS FROM POOLED REGRESSIONS
Definition Wage 
Variable* Size Variable Coef. t-value Size Variable Coef. t-value
FE, pooled log(Prod.work.)  0.090 15.773 log(Supervisors) 0.132 12.922
FE, country-spec. 0.091 15.938 0.133 12.930
OLS, pooled 0.069 13.068 0.123 12.557
OLS, country -spec. 0.068 13.114 0.120 12.438
FE, pooled log(Employment) 0.096 17.047 log(Employment) 0.105 12.623
FE, country-spec. 0.097 17.281 0.110 13.147
OLS, pooled 0.078 14.939 0.098 12.293
OLS, country -spec. 0.076 14.918 0.098 12.497
FE, pooled log(Capital) 0.050 14.484 log(Capital) 0.065 12.158
FE, country-spec. 0.051 15.021 0.066 12.223
OLS, pooled 0.035 10.812 0.058 11.306
OLS, country -spec. 0.034 10.927 0.057 11.292
* Note:
FE, pooled = Fixed Effects from Pooled regression; 
FE, c-spec. = Fixed Effects from country regressions; 
OLS, pooled = Average residual from Pooled regression; 
FE, c-spec. = Average residual from country regressions.TABLE 6 
VALUE-ADDED PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS: OLS ESTIMATES
[1] Sub-Saharan Africa [2] Morocco
Coef. Std. Err t-value Coef. Std. Err t-value
log Capital 0.198 0.034 5.880 0.346 0.034 10.040
log Production workers 0.482 0.050 9.540 0.487 0.040 12.080
log Supervisors 0.358 0.075 4.790 0.124 0.057 2.170
log Support staff 0.175 0.047 3.690 0.183 0.040 4.600
Wage: Production workers   0.580 0.121 4.790 0.124 0.123 1.000
Wage: Supervisors 0.065 0.104 0.630 0.177 0.065 2.740
Average education (years) 0.014 0.036 0.390 0.017 0.009 1.850
Average tenure (year) 0.017 0.012 1.430 -0.009 0.010 0.910
Firm age / 100 (years) -0.026 0.444 0.060 0.087 0.415 0.210
Any foreign ownership 0.109 0.138 0.790 0.002 0.085 0.030
Ivory Coast 0.833 0.333 2.500
Ethiopia -0.196 0.440 0.450
Cameroon 0.190 0.636 0.300
Zambia -0.360 0.210 1.710
Tanzania -0.206 0.203 1.020
Zimbabwe 0.202 0.193 1.050
Kenya x 1993 -0.171 0.187 0.910
Kenya x 1994 0.112 0.157 0.720
Kenya x 1998 -0.202 0.230 0.880
Kenya x 1999 -0.384 0.175 2.190
Cameroon x 1993 0.568 0.686 0.830
Zambia x 1993 0.057 0.216 0.260
Zambia x 1994 0.082 0.246 0.330
Tanzania x 1993 -0.797 0.398 2.000
Tanzania x 1994 -0.085 0.326 0.260
Zimbabwe x 1993 -0.166 0.118 1.410
Ghana x 1992 0.292 0.187 1.560
Morocco x 1999 -0.070 0.038 1.810
Ghana -0.628 0.179 3.510
Food  -0.050 0.139 0.360 0.254 0.114 2.230
Wood -0.385 0.141 2.730
Textile -0.266 0.137 1.940
R-squared 0.78 0.73
Observations 710 680
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual value-added, expressed in USD.
The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. TABLE 7 
VALUE-ADDED PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS: IV ESTIMATES
[1] Sub-Saharan Africa [2] Morocco
Coef. Std. Err t-value Coef. Std. Err t-value
log Capital 0.178 0.038 4.720 0.313 0.035 9.020
log Production workers 0.570 0.084 6.800 0.678 0.054 12.550
log Supervisors 0.298 0.085 3.500 0.043 0.067 0.650
log Support staff 0.174 0.048 3.640 0.113 0.047 2.390
Wage: Production workers   0.585 0.121 4.860 0.075 0.128 0.590
Wage: Supervisors 0.059 0.104 0.570 0.150 0.067 2.230
Average education (years) 0.022 0.037 0.600 0.028 0.010 2.710
Average tenure (year) 0.017 0.012 1.410 -0.005 0.011 -0.470
Firm age / 100 (years) 0.006 0.441 0.010 0.157 0.439 0.360
Any foreign ownership 0.103 0.139 0.740 -0.026 0.092 -0.280
Ivory Coast 0.780 0.339 2.300
Ethiopia -0.243 0.438 -0.550
Cameroon 0.167 0.627 0.270
Zambia -0.348 0.210 -1.660
Tanzania -0.207 0.204 -1.010
Zimbabwe 0.129 0.202 0.640
Kenya x 1993 -0.585 0.184 -3.180
Kenya x 1994 -0.182 0.189 -0.960
Kenya x 1998 0.096 0.156 0.620
Kenya x 1999 -0.161 0.239 -0.670
Cameroon x 1993 -0.375 0.177 -2.120
Zambia x 1993 0.672 0.688 0.980
Zambia x 1994 0.068 0.217 0.310
Tanzania x 1993 0.087 0.246 0.350
Tanzania x 1994 -0.757 0.400 -1.890
Zimbabwe x 1993 -0.054 0.325 -0.170
Ghana x 1992 -0.143 0.117 -1.220
Morocco x 1999 0.241 0.190 1.270 -0.080 0.039 -2.070
Ghana
Food  -0.071 0.139 -0.510 0.428 0.115 3.720
Wood -0.415 0.141 -2.950
Textile -0.309 0.138 -2.230
R-squared 0.73 0.78
Observations 710 680
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual value-added, expressed in USD.
The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Log Production workers is treated as an endogenous variable. The instruments are: total number 
of employees in previous period; education of manager or owner; location in capital city; 
and all exogenous variables in the structural specification.TABLE 8 
ESTIMATES OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
[1] Sub-Saharan Africa [2] Morocco
Coef. Std. Err t-value Coef. Std. Err t-value
Production Function
b 0.328 0.018 18.384 0.738 0.033 22.661
g 0.284 0.011 24.923 0.127 0.012 10.524
Effort Function
c 0.529 0.028 18.794 0.554 0.095 5.857
b 0.447 0.024 18.277 0.904 0.184 4.903
d 0.022 0.009 2.414 1.491 1.691 0.882
c' 0.369 0.060 6.193 0.600 0.151 3.969
b' 0.466 0.036 12.829 0.702 0.097 7.232
d' 1.226 0.668 1.834 3.017 0.934 3.230
Outside Option*
Production Workers
Kenya 43.0 14.5 2.955
Tanzania 25.0 8.5 2.946
Ghana 39.3 13.4 2.947
Zimbabwe 59.1 20.3 2.914
Zambia 51.6 17.5 2.955
Ivory Coast 121.1 42.3 2.863
Cameroon 185.3 63.7 2.908
Ethiopia 51.9 18.5 2.797
Burundi 41.5 14.7 2.817
Morocco 923.1 289.5 3.188
Supervisors
Kenya 508.2 79.6 6.382
Tanzania 261.0 39.1 6.680
Ghana 366.6 59.2 6.197
Zimbabwe 842.1 134.6 6.258
Zambia 524.0 81.8 6.408
Ivory Coast 1294.2 240.1 5.389
Cameroon 1783.5 292.9 6.088
Ethiopia 915.0 162.2 5.641
Burundi 644.1 129.9 4.958
Morocco 1864.6 285.7 6.526
TFP Shifters
Average education (years) 0.080 0.015 5.175 0.009 0.003 2.834
Average tenure (year) 0.015 0.006 2.501 0.0004 0.003 0.142
Firm age / 100 (years) 0.445 0.177 2.515 -0.034 0.103 0.327
Any foreign ownership 0.130 0.047 2.801 0.046 0.026 1.801
log (Support staff + 1 ) 0.240 0.018 13.363 0.145 0.016 8.937
Country effects Yes
Year effects Yes Yes






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The figure shows how worker effort responds to a change in TFP. 
Countries:1=Kenya; 2=Tanzania; 3=Ghana; 4=Zimbabwe; 5=Zambia; 6=Ivory Coast; 
7=Cameroon; 8=Ethiopia; 9=Burundi; 10=Morocco.  
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Note: The figure shows predicted wages for production workers and employment by 
country based on the estimated structural model. The country codes are shown in the 
notes to Figure 7.  
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Note: The figure shows predicted supervision wages and employment by country based 
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Note: The figure shows predicted supervision ratios  and employment by country based 
on the estimated structural model. The country codes are shown in the notes to Figure 7.  
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